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Law’s artifactual nature: how legal institutions
generate normativity
kenneth ehrenberg
There can be no doubt that law presents itself as a system of norms. The
doubts arise when we start to ask how and to whom those norms apply, if
ever. In recent decades much of the discussion in attempts to answer
those doubts has focused on notions of validity. Sometimes the discus-
sions of validity have centered on a kind of contextual, practice-centered
sort of validity we know as legal validity. While some people have tried to
show a direct relationship between that practice-centered validity and a
wider sort of moral normativity, a consensus has formed (between legal
positivists and modern natural lawyers) that legal validity itself need not
be directly dependent upon that wider validity. Sometimes the discus-
sions have been more directly about that wider validity – what makes it
the case, if ever, that one has a good reason to obey (or at least conform
one’s behavior) to the law. Those discussions are about what might give
law (at least some of ) the authority it claims for itself. If that authority is
legitimate, then the law’s norms (where legitimate) are valid in a broader
way. That is, where it is legitimate, we have good reason to obey the law,
where that reason applies to us as human beings or members of a given
community and not merely as legal addressees.
The difﬁculties arise in the space between the two validities: how to get
from a merely practice-dependent normativity to the wider normativity
to which the law aspires.
Some have tried to deﬂate this problem altogether, arguing it is not
really one for legal philosophers to concern themselves with, or that the
way in which the law activates our wider norms is unproblematic since it
cannot really create any new norms in that wider sphere. I want to
explore the idea that it is for legal philosophers to investigate and that
there is a possibility for the law’s creation of new practice-centered norms
to imply the ‘robust’ creation of new reasons applicable in the wider
sphere. I contend this possibility is to be found not so much in an
investigation of the validity conditions or the legitimization of legal
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authority by themselves, but in the relation between these facets and law’s
ontology. A better understanding of law’s nature will answer questions
about how its normativity arises and connects to us as human beings or
community members, rather than only as legal addressees.
The basic idea is that law is an institution and that a deeper
understanding of institutions will allow us to see how they can create
new non-prudential reasons for those subject to the institution. The focus
on non-prudential reasons is justiﬁed because they are clearly more
difﬁcult to create anew and also because we are used to seeing the law
create prudential reasons when it threatens us with coercion. In this latter
case, ‘trigger’ is more apt than ‘create’ precisely because our basic pru-
dential reasons are mostly already present.1 It is merely by altering
empirical and contingent facts that those prudential reasons are trig-
gered. The focus on non-prudential reasons is also appropriate precisely
because attempts to issue authoritative directives are attempts to create a
duty,2 and duties are a usual form that non-prudential reasons take.3
The question of who is subject to an institution is ultimately a question
of what legitimates its authority. But seeing precisely where the questions
of its authority arise can allow us to understand how its claims to impose
reasons might be valid more broadly. To say that law is an institution is
to say that it is intentionally created by human beings to serve a purpose,
which is to say that institutions are (generally) special kinds of artifacts,4
1 This is true in the sense that the paths we take to happiness or wellbeing can change
throughout our lives, as our characters and abilities change, interests wax and wane, and
new relationships are formed and lost. In distinguishing between the triggering and creation
of reasons I am borrowing some ideas of David Enoch. See “Authority and Reason-Giving,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00610.x/abstract), and “Reason-Giving and the Law,” in Leslie
Green and Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. I (Oxford University
Press, 2011), although I do not follow his precise understanding of the nature of this
distinction, as will become apparent.
2 “[T]he distinctive feature of authorities is that the reasons they can give robustly are
reasons of a special kind, duties.” Enoch, “Authority and Reason-Giving,” 11, emphasis in
original.
3 Aesthetic reasons (insofar as they are still reasons for action as opposed to belief ) are
arguably another form in which we see non-prudential reasons, but they need not concern
us here.
4 Amie L. Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 67 (2003) 580–699, at 592. Hart claimed “that legal obligations are very often
(though not always) human artifacts.” H. L. A. Hart, “Legal and Moral Obligation,” in
Richard E. Flathman (ed.), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1973), 188 (immediately extending this to include “rights, powers, immunities
and disabilities”), the caveat likely reserved for customary laws: understanding artifacts to
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albeit often abstract ones. Artifacts themselves are special kinds of tools.
Tools are things created or adapted to perform a function. Artifacts are
special in that they are created in order to be a speciﬁcally recognizable
kind of tool.5 Institutions are special in that their ability to perform their
function is dependent upon some kind of collective recognition, and not
merely on their structural features.6 Hence institutions are understood in
terms of their functionality, generally involving the conferral of a status
that implies deontic powers. A deeper exploration of the relation of the
institutionality of law to its normativity will answer questions about what
lends potentially wider robust validity to the norms it claims to impose.
The challenge of reasons and normative theory
When we talk about the way in which the law creates or manipulates our
reasons, there are two different kinds of reasons we might be talking
about.7 There are reasons of which an agent is psychologically aware and
which form the agent’s beliefs about her justiﬁcations for her action or
inaction, sometimes called ‘motivating reasons.’ When an agent is
weighing the pros and cons of an action and resolves the decision-
making process in favor of a speciﬁc option, the considerations weighed
by the agent in favor of the option chosen and against the options
rejected can be said to be the motivating reasons.
require deliberate creation. See also Brian Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurispru-
dence: A New Case for Scepticism,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2011), 663–77, at
666. John Gardner follows Hart in noting that law, as a generality, is a “genre” of artifacts,
while individual laws and legal systems are the actual artifacts. John Gardner, “The
Legality of Law,” Ratio Juris 17 (2004), 168–81, at 171. Elsewhere the word “kind” is used
instead of “genre” (as in “artifactual kind”). Amie L. Thomasson, “Artifacts in Metaphys-
ics,” in Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009).
5 On the relation between tools and artifacts, see Randall R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art Works,
and Agency (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 27–30. Thomasson argues
that artifacts do not have to be understood or identiﬁed in terms of their functions in order
to provide for artworks, but that many kinds still are best understood in terms of the
functions they are to perform. Amie L. Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and
Norms,” in Maarten Franssen et al. (eds.), Artefact Kinds: Ontology and the Human-Made
World (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013). In conversation, Thomasson agreed that institutions
are a kind of artifact understood in terms of their functions.
6 Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” 585, citing John R. Searle, The Construction of
Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 124.
7 My discussion here parallels that of Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law,” 15. See also
Ulrike Heuer, “Reasons and Actions and Desires,” Philosophical Studies 121 (2004), 43–63,
making the same distinction between “justiﬁcatory” and “explanatory” reasons.
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The other kind of reason that we might be talking about is a normative
reason, which serves as a justiﬁcation for an action. Sometimes this is
called an ‘objective reason,’ although that locution seems to carry more
metaphysical baggage.8 One important facet, however, of such reasons is
that the agent can have them without being aware of it. This is the kind of
reason one has to step aside when there is an anvil about to fall on one’s
head, even though one may be unaware of the anvil. As one type of such
reasons, one can be under an obligation without acknowledging or being
aware of the obligation. If we believe in the existence of a critical morality
in some form, then we are implying that the critical morality entails
normative reasons. Even beyond morality, if there are goals that are
valuable to everyone regardless of whether one has personally adopted
that goal, then we would say that everyone has a normative reason to
pursue that goal. An example here might be happiness, understood as the
ultimate source of all prudential reasons.
Non-prudential reasons can be motivational or normative. If one’s
belief that one has a reason to make a sacriﬁce motivates one to do so,
then that belief is serving as a motivating reason. Generally, however, our
interest here in non-prudential reasons is in their normative ﬂavor since
the main question is the relation between the institution of law and its
putative creation of non-prudential reasons.
It might initially be supposed that there is no problem with the law
creating objective normative reasons in the sense that there is no doubt
that the law exists in some form (yet to be explained) and hence there is
some ‘reality’ to the reasons it creates. If a given law is valid by the
standards of validity in place for the jurisdiction in question, then it is
‘real’ law and therefore provides a kind of objective reason, although it is
then a separate question whether anyone should ever follow that law
upon weighing all reasons in play. There is some merit to this way of
seeing things, especially as it seems to reﬂect an understanding of insti-
tutional reality. But our question is whether and how a particularly legal
reason might break through to be a newly created objective normative
reason for anyone to whom the law is addressed. To say that it is an
objective reason in the way that it is addressed is to imply that it has a
8 If one does not wish to be an externalist about reasons, one could believe that all of one’s
practical reasons are dependent upon one’s “subjective motivational set” but that one
could be unaware of all of the implications of the elements of that set. Bernard Williams,
“Internal and External Reasons,” in T. R. Harrison (ed.), Rational Action (Cambridge
University Press 1979), 18.
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moral character of trumping at least some other reasons held by those to
whom it is addressed. That is, it may preempt at least some of those other
reasons. This it may do by being a reason to exclude those other reasons.9
If the law can create or manipulate objective normative reasons at all,
it must be only in virtue of its legitimate (i.e. justiﬁed) authority and
hence limited to those cases in which it is legitimate. So it might initially
appear that natural law has a point in its favor: the law is deﬁcient if it is
not legitimately manipulating objective reasons, which it can only do
when it is legitimately authoritative. That requires the legal directives to
be morally acceptable. Hence, the only way for the law to impose
objective reasons would be if they are reﬂecting objective reasons we
already have, since it is these preexisting objective reasons that determine
what is morally acceptable.
This is where Joseph Raz comes in to explain how the law could be
manipulating objective reasons even where the law itself is only what
humans have made it and subject only to the validity conditions that they
make for it. On his view, legal validity is a kind of limit on law’s claim to
authority in that the claim only covers what is legally valid. However,
what legitimates law’s claim to authority is independent of that legal
validity. What generally determines whether the law’s claim to authority
is legitimate according to Raz is whether the law’s directive helps the
subject to conform better to the right balance of reasons that already
apply to her than she could do on her own.10 (Hence it is piecemeal in
that legal authority is only legitimate for certain laws, applied to certain
people, at certain times.) So it is possible for there to be a putative legal
directive that would reﬂect the right balance of reasons but for it not to be
legally valid (e.g. a valuable piece of legislation that is unconstitutional),
9 Here I follow Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn (Princeton University
Press 1990; ﬁrst published London: Hutchinson, 1975), 39. I also follow Raz in believing
that these reasons, where normative, operate to exclude counter-indicating reasons from
being acted upon, rather than deliberated about. Joseph Raz, “Authority and Justiﬁca-
tion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), 3–29, at 7; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 39. The opposing view can be seen in H. L. A. Hart,
Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 253; Scott J. Shapiro, “Authority,” in
Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and
Philosophy of Law (Oxford Universty Press, 2002), 406–7.
10 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 55–6; J. Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service
Conception,” Minnesota Law Review 90 (2006), 1018. The notion of the “right balance of
reasons” reﬂects the idea that there is possibly a correct answer in many situations where
we are weighing reasons in deciding how to act, which we would arrive at if we were
giving all of the applicable normative reasons their appropriate weight.
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and of course for there to be a legally valid directive that does not reﬂect
the right balance of reasons (for that person, under those circumstances).
Legal validity therefore serves as the determinant for the practice-
dependent normativity operative within the context of law. But authori-
tative legitimacy is the determinant for whether those practice-dependent
norms succeed in having a wider ‘robust’ normativity and whether the
law can therefore impart non-prudential reasons.11
Another way to approach this distinction is to consider the difference
between an engaged and detached perspective from which to approach
any normative system. Raz’s example is of the meat-eater saying, “You
ought not to eat that; it has meat,” to his vegetarian friend.12 The meat-
eater speaks to the friend from inside the normative system that the
friend has embraced without thereby implying that he embraces it
himself. From the external perspective, such as we might take as legal
theorists, we can discuss the ways in which the norms operate on those
for whom they are supposedly applicable without thereby implying that
we endorse those norms.13
The problem of legal normativity can therefore be understood initially
to be particularly acute for someone with positivist inclinations. If law is
merely a human creation, made by certain events and actions we engage
in, then it appears that whether something is a law is merely a matter of
fact about a state of affairs in a given jurisdiction. That is, statements of
the form ‘Legally, one ought to Φ’ are merely asserting the existence of a
state of affairs and not necessarily making any claims about what one
ought to do, since it is always a separate question whether one should do
it for that reason. To get from this fact about the law to the conclusion
that “Here, one ought to Φ” we need some argument to get us over the
apparent fact/value gap.
David Enoch denies this is necessary or that this is a problem for
positivists, claiming instead that law merely purports to activate preex-
isting reasons that we already have.14 This might often be the case, but it
is hard to swallow this claim in its entirety as the law does appear to
11 Most of the law’s directives take the form of non-prudential reasons. Where they are
legally valid but not authoritatively legitimate, the most they do is trigger a prudential
reason by threatening coercion for non-compliance.
12 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1975 edn), 175–6. See also Joseph Raz, The Authority of
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 156–7.
13 This is not to say that acceptance of the norms is necessary, since whether consent is
necessary for legal norms to apply is a separate question for political philosophy.
14 Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law.”
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create wholly new reasons sometimes. By denying that the law creates
new reasons whole cloth (rather than merely activating preexisting
reasons), Enoch solves the problem of understanding the source of law’s
normativity. But this comes at the cost of going against what certainly
seems to happen when the law sets forth how to make a valid will, or
gives direction to Hart’s “puzzled man,”15 who is looking to the law for
guidance. Take the example of ﬂag law,16 the set of rules for how to treat
the United States ﬂag, which does not have any punishments for non-
compliance. We can see that one who merely wants to be law-abiding
now has a set of reasons for behaving in a certain way toward the ﬂag.
Even someone who had the motivation to be respectful toward the ﬂag
needs the law to set forth some of the standards for that respectful
treatment. If I were so motivated, I might be able to intuit that I should
not burn the ﬂag, or perhaps not let it touch the ground. But how am
I supposed to know that “respecting the ﬂag” includes folding it into a
triangle with the stars and blue ﬁeld showing, or that it should be on its
right when displayed with other ﬂags? Wherever the law is not capturing
preexisting behavioral standards but creating those standards, it creates
reasons (rather than merely activates them) for those who are motivated
or have good normative reasons to comply. A way to better understand
this is to examine Enoch’s claims to the contrary.
After distinguishing the giving of normative reasons into three groups:
epistemic reason-giving (reminding someone of a preexisting reason that
had already been applied), triggering reason-giving (activating a reason
that the person already had but was not yet applicable), and “robust”
reason-giving (creating a reason that did not exist before),17 Enoch
claims that a legal reason is rather like an imaginary friend, in that the
most it can be on its own is a reason in the context of a practice.18 This is
akin to the idea that the rules of a game are only reasons for those already
committed to playing the game. This will not be of much use to a greater
understanding of law since any practice can create such reasons inside its
own context. If we join him in seeing a clear distinction between legal
reasons and real (normative) reasons, we can understand the force of
15 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz 2nd edn
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; ﬁrst published 1961), 40.
16 Flag Code, 4 United States Code, §§3–9.
17 Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law,” 4–6. As we will see, he evenutally says that robust
reason-giving is really just a special case of triggering reasons. David Enoch, “Giving
Practical Reasons,” Philosophers’ Imprint 11 (2011), 1–22, 9.
18 Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law,” 18.
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Raz’s point that legal reasons are claims to impose or reﬂect normative
reasons. Sometimes those claims might be true and sometimes they
are false.
Law, seen this way, is a practice-context that has contextually bound
reasons for people who are committed to that context in some way. For
those already in the game and committed to playing it, the legal rules can
be real rules to the extent that their commitment is morally valid or
binding. This is not to say that once you are subject to the law in one area
you are committed to playing the legal game and therefore must see those
contextual reasons as real. Rather, as with many other contexts, you may
sometimes be bound and other times you may not be bound. The rules
themselves might in some cases be reasons not to participate in the
context, especially if they lead one away from what one has good ‘real’
reasons to do.
A context-dependent reason is a kind of putative reason. It becomes a
real normative reason when one is in that context and becomes commit-
ted to it (which may or may not happen voluntarily). But, pace Enoch,
contexts are not quite the same as the realm of the imagination. Some
putative contextual reasons may succeed in being real reasons regardless
of whether one endorses the context. We do not say moral reasons are
like imaginary friends precisely because everyone has a real reason to be
moral, regardless of whether she has accepted anything about the moral
‘context.’ Law is somewhat weird because, seen from outside, it looks
more like a context such as a game, while at the same time it appears to
be making the claim that it is more like morality in providing real non-
prudential reasons. It is that weirdness that is and should be of interest to
legal philosophers and calls for our understanding. Why should we take
this general claim on the part of law seriously at all, and what about law
seems to necessitate this claim?
Enoch argues that robust reason-giving is itself a special instance of
triggering reasons. His argument is based on the idea that no one can give
a robust reason unless the recipient already has a conditional reason to
treat the issuance as a reason.19 If my telling you to do something can
actually give you a reason to do it, this must be because you already have
a reason to do that thing if and when I tell you to do it. Hence my telling
you to do something merely activates the condition precedent of your
preexisting conditional reason. The upshot of this is that even instances
19 Enoch, “Giving Practical Reasons,” 9–10.
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of what Enoch thinks can be considered robust reason-giving are actually
still merely triggering these conditional reasons.20
This view strikes me as problematic in that it appears to suggest that
one is born with all the reasons one will ever have in life (at least in some
conditional form). There is something trivially true but also unillumin-
ating about the claim in that every reason is conditioned upon some
conditional precedent being true. To say that all instances of robust
reason-giving are merely instances of triggering because one could come
up with some antecedent conditional statement that was already true is
almost like saying that nothing new ever happens because we can
always come up with some statement about the past that was already
true and included some conditional causal antecedents about the event in
question.
In correspondence, Enoch has clariﬁed that he thinks one is born with
all of the “ultimate, grounding reasons” that one has in life, and that this
group includes all of one’s conditional reasons, with new reasons arriving
as a result of those conditions being triggered. This has a number of
implications that strike me as strange. One is that the conditional reason
“I have a reason to take extra care to ensure the wellbeing of H, if I marry
her” and “I have a reason to take extra care to ensure the wellbeing of H”
(where H is my wife) are two different reasons. Another one is that I am
born with the ﬁrst (conditional) reason, although admittedly not the
second. This seems to imply that I have a conditional reason to take
extra care to ensure the wellbeing of everyone on the planet (or at least
those I could possibly marry).21 A third strange implication is that the
grounds for any unconditional reason are always therefore a vast number
of conditional reasons that have the unconditional reason as a conse-
quent. When I think of the ground for a reason, I think of a more
ultimate value that serves as the justiﬁcation for that reason. I do not
see how a tacked-on condition precedent is really a ground for that
reason, even if it captures a set of empirical facts that would make the
reason valid for me. We need to make a distinction between a more
general reason that serves as a ground for more particular ones, and a
precondition that must be present for a reason to exist (or apply). It
seems reasonable to suppose that I am born with a reason to take extra
care to ensure the wellbeing of those with whom I form a close
20 More on what distinguishes this subclass of robust reason-giving below.
21 I probably have a non-conditional reason to take some care to ensure the wellbeing of
everyone on Earth, but only a reason to take extra care of a small subset of them.
law as artifact and normativity 255
Comp. by: AbdulMalik Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 12 Title Name: PAVLAKOSetal
Date:16/9/14 Time:13:09:47 Page Number: 256
relationship. This is the ground for my ‘conditional reason’ to take extra
care to ensure the wellbeing of H, if I marry her. But once that condition
is met, the reason is not distinct from my reason to take extra care to
ensure the wellbeing of H.
I believe what is multiplying reasons here is the assumption that every
logically distinct true proposition that describes a reason refers to a
distinct reason. But my reason to take extra care to ensure the wellbeing
of any woman who becomes my wife and my reason to take extra care to
ensure the wellbeing of the woman who does become my wife are the
same reason. Of course, there are unique things about the particular
woman who became my wife that gave me additional distinctive reasons
that are particular to her. But under Enoch’s taxonomy, I would have
already had an additional conditional copy of those reasons before I ever
met her. Consider the following. On Enoch’s view the statement “I have a
reason to take extra care of H, if I marry her” was true upon my birth,
although “I have a reason to take extra care of H” was not true upon
my birth. That proves to him that these are two distinct reasons, and
that triggering is a form of reason creation. I claim, however, that both
propositions refer to the same reason, even though one proposition was
true at my birth and the other was not. The ﬁrst proposition was true at
my birth but the reason it described was not yet created. This seems
required by some form of metaphysical parsimony about reasons, if the
strange implications I noted above did not sufﬁce. Hence a ‘conditional
reason’ with an untrue (or not yet true) condition precedent is not (yet) a
reason. This should not be so surprising. Assuming I can legitimately give
my military subordinate a reason to clean parts of the barracks by
ordering her to do so, I have not yet changed her reasons for action by
saying to her “You must clean the latrine if I order you to do so.” But
when I say “I order you to clean the latrine,” I have given her a new
reason for action, even if that is grounded on preexisting general reasons
to follow my orders regarding cleaning parts of the barracks.
While much of what I have to say about the ontology of legal norms may
work even if one agrees with Enoch’s picture of triggering and conditional
norms, I think it is important to note the reasonableness of a picture that
allows for the potential for law to create norms entirely anew.
Independently of its relation to triggering reasons, Enoch gives a
communicated-intention-based account of robust reason-giving.22 There
22 Enoch, “Authority and Reason-Giving,” 12–15.
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are three parts to the account: I must intend to give you a reason to φ and
communicate that intention to you; I must intend that you recognize my
intention; and I must intend your reason to φ to depend on your
recognition of my communicated intention to give you a reason to φ.
The worry then arises whether anything other than “persons or person-
like organs can play the role of an authority.”23 That is, the ability to give
a robust non-prudential reason such as a moral duty depends on the
communication of an intention to do so, which is needed in order to
distinguish the possibility of successful creation of duties from merely
triggering preexisting non-prudential reasons. But building in this
communicated-intention requirement seems to mean that only other
people (or bodies) can be authorities, not the law itself.24 One easy
solution to this problem is to say simply that the authority is vested in
the lawmaker, whatever person or body that might be, and that talk of the
authority of law is merely metaphorical. However, this solution does
not sit well when we think of the antiquity of some legal norms that
are still apparently binding, especially when some of those legal norms
are borrowed directly from jurisdictions we would not think meet our
normative requirements for political legitimacy (as is the case with the
remaining American legal norms whose legal validity is sourced in
medieval English law). This is precisely where the metaphysical questions
about law become important. A better understanding of law’s ontology
will solve the problem of how a communicated intention can exist and
possibly be robustly reason-giving when there is no identiﬁable human
being or body we would identify as having the authority to address us
directly. Creators’ intentions about the content of the law and their
communication to us are bound up into the law by its artifactual nature;
their applicability across the ages is explained by its institutionality.
Institutions, artifacts, and the communication of intention
As mentioned above, institutions can be understood as a subclass of
artifacts, although institutions may be abstract in that they might not
be identical to whatever concrete entities they may be associated with.
23 Ibid.
24 To be fair, Enoch is agnostic about whether the law can communicate the necessary
intentions to robustly give reasons. “Reason-Giving and the Law,” 30, says that if the law
is capable of robustly giving reasons, it must be carrying the complex intentions of the
legislature.
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Institutions like universities are not identical to any set of physical
entities such as their students, faculty, administrators, buildings, or land.
Laws and legal systems are certainly abstract institutions in that they are
not identical with the people constituting the legal ofﬁcials, the words
written in books or scrolls of law, or the geographic area of their
jurisdiction. Even if abstract institutions frequently confer status on
physical objects, the object should not be confused for the institution
that conferred the status. Money is an institution; a piece of currency is
not, although we can say whether a given piece of paper is money is an
institutional fact about the paper. Under John Searle’s theory, an insti-
tutional fact is created by the collectively intended assignment of a status
function by using a constitutive rule.25 That status function conveys
deontic powers, which is to say that the bearer of the status can “provide
desire-independent reasons for action,”26 including non-prudential
reasons. The key is the collective acceptance of some set of conditions,
which, if fulﬁlled, brings the institution into existence. The immediate
questions are what are the normative grounds for that collective
acceptance, i.e. what is a good reason to accept those conditions; how
wide must that collective acceptance be; and how the status function
conveys deontic powers.
The constitutive rule sets the conditions for membership and hence
applicability of the institution’s norms. Some institutions are relatively
static and do not require much alteration after their creation. In these,
there may not be much room for roles or ofﬁces. But in other, more
dynamic, institutions, there will generally be roles or ofﬁces, themselves
creations of the institution and which carry deontic powers to alter the
(institutionally context-bound) normative space of those subject to the
institution. In a legal institution, those deontic powers are themselves
legal creations and are to be characterized as such. (The law is a special
kind of institution in that one of its key functions is the creation of other
institutions; legal systems are therefore institution-generating institu-
tions.) The deontic powers are held by ofﬁcials, or possibly by individual
laws and regulations themselves if they can operate without ofﬁcial
25 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 23–8. The constitutive rule tends to take the form
“X counts as Y in context C.” Thomasson broadens this to account for abstract insti-
tutional entities, which are not applied to preexisting objects. Thomasson, “Realism and
Human Kinds,” 587–8. Searle has also broadened his view, in part for the same reasons.
John R. Searle, Making the Social World (Oxford University Press, 2010), 19–20.
26 Searle, Making the Social World, 23.
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intervention.27 They have a system or practice-based normativity
applicable to anyone subject to that system. Again, we can analyze that
normativity in two ways. The ﬁrst way is merely in terms of the system
itself as a practice and seeing the normativity it imposes through the
creation of its institutional deontic powers. In this way we can analyze
legal normativity in an external but engaged fashion, speaking about legal
reasons as applying to whomever the system claims it applies, treating
those legal subjects as practice participants. (It is far from unusual for
other social institutions and practices to make normative claims upon
more people than those who belong to it or acknowledge the authority of
the institution to do so. Organized religions are one example.) The other
way to analyze that normativity is to ask what might give someone a
robust reason for being bound by those system norms. This is to inquire
into the conditions for legitimating the claims that the law makes that all
its directives are morally binding on those to whom they are directed.
If they are truly morally binding, then those who are subject to them have
a good reason to see themselves as bound, whether or not they acknow-
ledge that reason.
Whether the norms are viewed contextually or robustly, however, what
is important here is that it is possible for institutions to be created anew,
usually by a kind of declaration that is collectively accepted.28 The new
status that is created consists partially in the deontic powers that are
conferred by the acceptance of the constitutive rule that creates the new
status. This self-referentiality is an important feature of how collective
acceptance confers status and creates norms. For something to have the
properties of a given institutional kind, it must be believed to be of that
kind; the belief that it is of that kind makes it so.29 Hence, part of what it
is to have an institutional status is the ability to create new reasons for
those subject to the institution. If the institution persists, then the new
reasons it creates for those subject to it may also persist. Since the status
and the new reasons created by the deontic powers are so closely linked,
we can say that part of what it is for the institution to persist is for the
reasons it creates to continue to apply. Conversely, by the time none of its
created reasons any longer apply to anyone, the institution has ceased to
27 I am here imagining some kind of system that automatically generates and sends a
violation notice to motorists tripping a camera when running a red light.
28 Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” 589; Searle, Making the Social World, 85–6.
29 Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” 585, citing Searle, Construction of Social
Reality, 32.
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exist (although other associated artifacts might continue to exist). Hence
we have the beginnings of an answer to the question of how reasons
created by people long dead and not authoritative in the properties they
had when alive can continue to be applicable to us today. Their reasons
retain their context-dependent normativity just in case their institution-
ality is still retained; they retain any robust normativity to the extent they
are (now) legitimately authoritative to their addressees. They can con-
tinue to address people long into the future so long as the institution itself
persists and that persistence depends on continued collective acceptance.
As for the questions of how the institution generates norms and who
is in the ambit of collective acceptance, Amie Thomasson has a compel-
ling argument that because an institution is a self-conscious creation, the
group who collectively accepts the institutional status cannot be ignorant
of or in serious error as to its nature or contents.30 The collective
acceptance of the relevant set of conditions that are declared sufﬁcient
for the creation of the institution make it the case that those conditions
are sufﬁcient to create the institution.31 And we cannot be massively
wrong about the instantiation of those conditions since it is generally our
perception of those conditions which we declare sufﬁcient for creation of
the institution.32 Since the content of the institutional status is (partially)
the desire-independent reasons it purports to create, those parts of the
collective acceptance of the institution cannot be massively wrong about
the creation of its norms.
This does not tell us anything about the scope or nature of that
collective acceptance which creates the institution.33 It simply states that,
30 Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” 588–90.
31 We can be wrong about necessary conditions and other conditions that are not criterial of
the institution. Ibid.
32 The dispute between inclusive and exclusive legal positivists can be understood to be over
whether the conditions sufﬁcient for the creation of a legal institution must be percep-
tions (or beliefs). Both would agree that we cannot be wrong about the conditions
sufﬁcient for the creation of a legal institution (i.e. that the legal validity conditions are
as the community determines them to be); they disagree about whether we can be wrong
about whether those conditions are instantiated (i.e. whether there can be an element of
those validity conditions the instantiation of which is beyond our epistemic access). The
more serious or massive the error that inclusive positivism allows, the less likely it is
consistent with this understanding of the metaphysics of institutions.
33 Thomasson’s theory of artifacts does not depend on collective intentionality (Thomasson,
“Artifacts and Human Concepts,” in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds.), Cre-
ations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and their Representation (Oxford University
Press, 2007), 52), although her theory of institutions as a subset does (Thomasson,
“Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms,” 54). Nevertheless, this understanding of
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where there is an institution, there is some group whose collective
acceptance confers that institutional status, thereby implying the power
to give reasons and alter the normative space for those subject to it. But
that protection from error does not extend to individuals or to groups
outside the collective whose acceptance creates and sustains the insti-
tution.34 This opens up the possibility for empirical research or discovery
and highlights the importance of social scientiﬁc investigation into
the conditions creating the institutions we see ourselves and others
believing in.
We also have an answer for Enoch: he got the picture partially right
but did not allow that questions of what makes legal normativity morally
legitimate may still be an apt subject for legal philosophers. The reason
that it is an apt subject is precisely that the law is claiming moral
legitimacy. Hence, it is certainly within our dossier to comment upon
that claim and to investigate the circumstances in which it may be
accurate. In doing so, we may be admitting that the law is usually merely
activating reasons that already apply, even when it does have moral
legitimacy. But by acknowledging its institutional nature, we are open
to the possibility that it creates new norms that were not originally
present and merely activated by the law. They are sometimes akin to
imaginary norms as Enoch claims would be the case with any merely
practice-based norms. But where the law’s claim to moral legitimacy is
accurate (if ever) and where that accuracy coincides with the creation
of a new norm that did not already apply to the subject, there is a space
for law to make a real normative difference that Enoch does not
acknowledge.
One might object here that, insofar as we are seeing legitimacy along
Razian lines, in order for just about any legal directive to be legitimately
authoritative, it must be based upon preexisting, “dependent” reasons.
These are reasons that already apply to the person who is subject to the
directive. If that is the case, the objection might go, then Enoch must still
be right since the law is merely activating these preexisting dependent
reasons. The answer is that, for a directive to be legitimately authoritative
institutions appears compatible with a range of different theories of collective intention-
ality. See ibid., citing Searle, Construction of Social Reality; Michael E. Bratman, Faces of
Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge University Press 1999);
Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1996).
34 Thomasson, “Realism and Human Kinds,” 591.
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under Raz, it need not be based directly on these dependent reasons;
it need only reﬂect those reasons.35 While there must ultimately be
underlying dependent reasons that apply to the subject, it is not the case
that the law’s directive must be directly based on those underlying
reasons in order to be legitimate. If it is not based on those underlying
reasons but merely reﬂecting them, then it opens up more space to say
that the law is doing more than simply activating existing reasons.
One way to see this is to remember the complexity of reasons and
how they are created. In order to be legitimately authoritative, the law’s
directives must at least reﬂect those underlying dependent reasons
(according to Raz). This means that legal directives must ultimately aid
the subject to comply with the correct balance of those reasons that already
apply to her: the dependent reasons. Hence, on thismodel, it is easy to see a
view like Enoch’s get off the ground: if the law is merely reﬂecting
preexisting reasons when legitimate, then the most it can do is either to
remind us of the applicability of that preexisting reason (an “epistemic”
form of reason-giving in his taxonomy) or to activate those preexisting
reasons, perhaps marshaling them to coordinate behavior or otherwise
provide the kind of guidance we need in order to comply with the best
balance of all those reasons (a “triggering” form of reason-giving in his
taxonomy). Since the law ismerely changing social facts, themost it can do
is trigger a preexisting normative reason one already had but was not yet
applicable.36 For Enoch, to trigger a reason, a fact need only be “norma-
tively signiﬁcant,”37 but to provide a robust reason is for the communi-
cation itself to make the normative difference. That is, a robust instance of
reason-giving requires, on Enoch’s view, the reason’s creationmerely from
facts about the communication, e.g. the intention to create such a reason in
the listener and that the communication itself serve as the listener’s
reason.38 The idea is to capture the distinction between seeing a request
as a reason to comply on its own, and seeing making the requester happy
as an instrumental reason given further goals or values of the listener.
Most of the time when we accede to the law’s demands of us, we are very
likely seeing any reason-giving on the part of the law as triggering in
Enoch’s sense. But the law does purport to give us reasons merely because
it is the law and not by triggering reasons thatwe already have. Is there away
to say that when it commands compliance merely because it is the law it is
robustly reason-giving even if that command is only legitimate where it
35 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 51. 36 Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law,” 26.
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.
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reﬂects preexisting reasonswe already have? This depends again onwhether
one is sufﬁciently internal to the practice to see the law’s reason-giving as
robust, which itself depends on whether the directive is legitimate.
Here is where it becomes important to see laws as a genre of artifacts.
They are artifacts in that they are specialized creations of human inten-
tionality that serve speciﬁc purposes and are designed in order to be
recognized as such. Artifacts themselves are a special case of tools, which
would be anything adapted or used for a human purpose. Artifacts are
distinct in that they are designed to be recognizable as the speciﬁc kind of
tool that they are. That means at the very least that the creator of the
artifact has in mind that others will see the artifact for the kind of thing it
is supposed to do (where, as with law, we are dealing with public artifacts
that are understood in terms of the function they are to perform). This is
a kind of communication between creator and those who will in the
future come into contact with the artifact. Hence, if Enoch is right that
communicated requests can be sufﬁcient for robust reason-giving, then it
seems that artifact creators can perform a similar kind of communication
merely through the creation of objects that are intended to be seen by
others in a certain way. This does not mean that they are creating a
reason to treat the object in a very precise way such that we are norma-
tively bound not to repurpose those objects. But it does seem likely, as
Amie Thomasson notes, that the identity of an artifact as a certain kind
of thing does provide some robust norms of treatment.39
Imagine I sew the ﬂag of a country in which we happen to be located.
(Assume for the sake of simplicity that this country has no laws about
how to treat its ﬂag.) There are likely all sorts of norms that are thereby
created with regard to this object I have made. They may not be precisely
the norms I intended to create. For example, I may hate the government
of that country and have created the ﬂag with the intention that you burn
it. Nonetheless, I still intend that the object be recognized as the ﬂag
and not, for example, as a dinner napkin. That seems to create a reason
for you to treat it as a ﬂag, even if one intended treatment in this case is
to burn it. Now in making the ﬂag-token I am also calling up its
39 Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms,” 51. While Thomasson’s aim in
this article is to show that artifacts need not have intended functions in order to
generalize the theory of the metaphysics of artifacts to include works of art, she acknow-
ledges that some kinds of artifacts are to be understood in terms of intended functions.
Ibid. She also agreed in conversation that individual laws have intended functions on her
analysis and that law, as a genre of artifact (particularly an institutional one), is therefore
to be understood in terms of those functions.
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institutional status. Hence, even if I wish you to burn the ﬂag I created, if
many norms of the wider institution are legitimate, that could undermine
the reason-giving efﬁcacy of my speciﬁc intention for you to burn it.
(Even if there are no laws against ﬂag burning, saying the norms of the
institution are generally legitimate is to say that it is providing a valuable
service in the creation of those norms. As a result there may be moral
reasons not to burn its ﬂag even if there are no legal reasons not to do so.)
Hence, when I create the ﬂag-token, some of my communicated
intentions may be successfully norm-creating and others may not.
On Thomasson’s analysis, something is an exemplar of an (“essen-
tially”40) artifactual kind
only if it is the product of a largely successfully executed intention to
make [an exemplar of that kind,] where the maker must have a substan-
tive concept of the nature of [those artifacts] that largely matches that of
some prior [ ] makers (if any) and intend to realize that concept by
making an object with [ ] relevant features [of the kind].41
We can broaden this to include institutional entities that are the result
of collective creation and recognition. The key for our purposes is to
recognize that some of those relevant features are “receptive.” That is,
they are “intended ways in which the object is to be regarded, used, or
treated.”42 This is not to say that the creator of the artifact must create it
with the intention that it actually be recognized as a member of that kind.
Rather, it is only necessary that (for public artifacts, which are our
primary focus) it is intended to be “recognizable” at least to an intended
audience.43 For many genres of public artifacts, the main (sometimes the
only) thing that distinguishes them is the norms of treatment they receive
and hence the recognizability of the artifact carries with it those norms of
treatment.44 That is, for many such artifacts, what it is to be that artifact
40 “[A]n essentially artifactual kind is a kind that necessarily has in its extension all and only
artifacts – considered as intended products of human action.” Ibid.
41 Ibid., citing “Realism and Human Kinds,” 599–600.
42 Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms,” 49.
43 Ibid. The limitation to “public artifacts” excludes artifacts that are designed not to be
recognizable to anyone, or only to the creator. Institutions, requiring collective
acceptance as they do, come within the class of public artifacts.
44 Ibid., citing Roman Ingarden, Ontology of the Work of Art, trans. Raymond Meyer
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989; originally Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst,
1962), 260–1. Thomasson notes that these are genuine norms and not regularities of
behavior as “misuse” of the artifact or “improper” behavior with regard to it are subject to
“correction or rebuke.” Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms,” 53.
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is to bear those norms of treatment, and it is the intention of its creator
that it carry those norms, which are thereby at least partially constitutive
of its identity.45
Now we are closer to seeing how it must be possible to create com-
pletely new reasons for action upon creating artifacts and hence laws as a
species of artifact. Since it is possible to create new artifact types,46 as well
as to create new exemplars of existing artifact types that still differ from
their predecessors in some of their structural or receptive features,47 it
must be possible to create new norms of treatment that are constitutive of
these new entities. To the extent that the artifact is a public kind, then
those norms are addressed to the community that comprises the poten-
tial users of the artifact. This is not to say that the creator of a wholly new
artifact type is necessarily successful in the particular norms of treatment
that she might intend for her artifact. But for her creation to be successful
at all, it generally will have to be recognizable as a member of a more
general kind that comes with some norms already in place. When people
recognize its value as a distinct type they will then start to generate
additional norms of treatment that may or may not be in line with her
intentions. The key for us to take away from this discussion of artifacts is
the possibility of new norms, not from where they come or to whom they
might apply. But when we think of institutions as a subclass of these
public artifacts then we start to see a clearer picture of how people in
certain roles might have privileged places from which to ensure those
new norms are what they intend them to be and apply to that group
within the institution’s ambit.
Conclusion
Law as a genre is a type of institutionalized abstract artifact. That it is a
type of artifact means that it has some receptive features, some of which
are norms of treatment that its tokens tend to share. The creators of those
tokens (legislation, judicial decisions, administrative rules, etc.) intend
45 Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms,” 56. 46 Ibid.
47 Beth Preston calls this phenomenon of artifacts “reproduction with variation” and it is
one of several phenomena characteristic of artifact functions that must be accommodated
by any complete theory of artifacts. Preston, “Philosophical Theories of Artifact Func-
tion,” in Meijers, Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences, 216–17. As she and
Thomasson both note, even new artifact types tend to be improvements upon existing
broader artifact types in some way. Thomasson, “Public Artifacts, Intentions and
Norms,” 56.
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what they create to be publicly recognizable as law and generally to share
in those norms of treatment. Since part of what it is to be an exemplar of
that type of artifact is that it bears some of those norms, to the extent the
creation is successful (determined in law by the criteria of legal validity)
the token carries some of those general norms of treatment and possibly
creates new ones in terms of what is distinctive about that exemplar. That
it is a type of institution means that it confers a special status on some
members or other elements within its ambit. That special status tends to
include deontic powers to give non-prudential reasons by the institu-
tion’s own lights. Where those reasons are legitimately authoritative,
the institution has successfully created the non-prudential reasons it
claims to have created. Where they are not legitimately authoritative,
they merely alter empirical facts about how members of the institution
are likely to treat actions in compliance and non-compliance with those
contextual norms (implying a possible triggering of prudential reasons
to comply). This picture therefore holds out the possibility of the law
creating entirely new reasons for action and explains the contours of that
normativity.
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